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Abstract
In Team Semantics, a dependency notion is strongly first order if every
sentence of the logic obtained by adding the corresponding atoms to First
Order Logic is equivalent to some first order sentence. In this work it is
shown that all nontrivial dependency atoms that are strongly first order,
downwards closed, and relativizable (in the sense that the relativizations
of the corresponding atoms with respect to some unary predicate are ex-
pressible in terms of them) are definable in terms of constancy atoms.
Additionally, it is shown that any strongly first order dependency is
safe for any family of downwards closed dependencies, in the sense that
every sentence of the logic obtained by adding to First Order Logic both
the strongly first order dependency and the downwards closed dependen-
cies is equivalent to some sentence of the logic obtained by adding only
the downwards closed dependencies.
1 Introduction
Team Semantics [26] generalizes Tarskian semantics for First Order Logic by
defining the satisfaction relation with respect to sets of assignments, called
teams, rather with respect to single assignments. Team Semantics was orig-
inally developed in order to provide a compositional semantics equivalent to
the imperfect-information, game-theoretic semantics of Independence-Friendly
Logic [24, 23, 37]; however, with the work of Va¨a¨na¨nen [39] it became clear that
this semantics is a natural generalization of Tarskian semantics, one which –
even putting aside its connections with the theory of databases (see for instance
[30]) – greatly extends its expressive capabilities by allowing the study of a far
greater range of atoms and operators.
One of the most peculiar aspects of Team Semantics is the way in which it
straddles the boundary between first order and second order: while the syntaxes
of the logics based on Team Semantics studied so far have for the most part a
solidly first order flavour, in the sense that they involve no explicit higher order
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quantification1, their expressive power often rises well above the one of First
Order Logic, all the way up to Existential Second Order Logic (as in the cases
of Dependence Logic [39] and Independence Logic [20]) or even to full Second
Order Logic (as in the case of Team Logic [40, 31]).
This is the case even for logics, such as the above mentioned Dependence
Logic and Independence Logic or for Inclusion Logic [13], which only add to the
language of First Order Logic dependency atoms whose satisfaction conditions
are first order definable as properties of relations. In brief, this is due to the
higher order quantification hidden in Team Semantics rules for disjunction and
existential quantification (see Rules TS-∨ andTS-∃ of Definition 2.6). For First
Order Logic proper there exists a strict equivalence between Team Semantics
and the usual Tarskian semantics on the level of sentences (see Proposition 2.8),
but this equivalence fails badly on the level of formulas: there exist properties
of relations that are first order definable (in the sense that they are defined
by a first order sentence φ(R)), but that do not correspond to the satisfaction
conditions of any first order formula in Team Semantics (that is, there is no first
order formula ψ(x) which is satisfied by a set of assignments X if and only if
the corresponding relation satisfies φ(R)). Adding new atoms with these (first
order definable) satisfaction conditions, therefore, will increase the expressive
power of the logic, in the sense that there will be formulas of this new logic
which are not equivalent to any first order formula.
Does it follow that this new logic will be more expressive also with respect
to sentences, in the sense that there will exist sentences of this new logic which
are not equivalent to any first order sentence? Not necessarily. While this is
true for e.g. Dependence Logic and Independence Logic (that is, for the logics
obtained by adding the functional dependence atoms or the independence atoms
of Definition 2.11 respectively), it is possible to find dependencies for which this
is not the case: while adding them to the language of First Order Logic makes
it more expressive with respect to formulas, every sentence of this new logic
is still equivalent to some first order sentence. Dependency atoms, or families
of dependency atoms, for which this is the case are called strongly first order
[15, 16].
This asymmetry between expressivity on the level of formulas and expres-
sivity on the level of sentences is one of the most intriguing aspects of Team
Semantics; and, in particular, the fact that when using Team Semantics it is
possible to generate logics with expressive powers between that of First Order
Logic FO and that of Existential Second Order Logic ESO (included) simply
by adding to FO atoms with first order definable satisfaction conditions makes
Team Semantics an eminently suitable tool for the study and classification of
fragments of ESO, a topic rich with open questions and with deep connections
with important complexity-theoretic conjectures.
The study of strongly first order dependencies, in particular, can be thought
of as an attempt to investigate the border between first order and second order
“from below” by seeking to characterize precisely which choices of dependency
1The majority quantifier of [7] could arguably be considered an exception to this.
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atoms (or families of dependency atoms) breach or fail to breach it. The conjec-
ture according to which a dependency is strongly first order if and only if it is
definable in terms of upwards closed dependencies and constancy dependencies2
is, however, still unproven. In this work, a proof for a special case of it will be
found: if a non-trivially-false dependency is strongly first order, is downwards
closed, and is furthermore relativizable (a new, natural property of dependencies
which will be introduced in this work)3 then it is definable in terms of constancy
atoms alone.
A property related to strong first orderness and introduced in the recent
article [17] is safety. In brief, a dependency (or a set of dependencies) is safe for
some logic if it can be added to it without increasing the expressive power (wrt
sentences) of the resulting formalism. In particular, a dependency is strongly
first order if and only if it is safe for First Order Logic. This notion of safety,
thus, generalizes the notion of strong first orderness to logics more expressive
than pure First Order Logic, and a complete characterization of safety would
provide a full classification of the expressive powers of the logics obtained by
adding dependencies to logics with Team Semantics. Safety, however, is a sur-
prisingly delicate notion: for instance, as shown in [17], constancy – despite
being perhaps the simplest example of strongly first order dependency – is not
safe for First Order Logic plus certain classes of dependencies (e.g. unary inclu-
sion dependencies). In this work it will be shown that, in the case of downwards
closed dependencies, safety is more robust: any strongly first order dependency
is safe for First Order Logic plus any family containing only downwards closed
dependencies. This result, aside from being interesting in its own right, will
be essential for the characterization of strongly first order downwards closed
relativizable dependencies mentioned above.
Much of the research in the area of Team Semantics thus far has focused
on the study of specific logics obtained by adding specific atoms (or specific
operators) to First Order Logic with Team Semantics. This is an important
direction of research, and many of the resulting logics are of independent interest
(and, often, have intriguing connections with the theory of databases). But an
equivalently important, if so far understandably4 less studied, one consists in
the classification of general families of such logics in terms of their relationships
and of their meta-logical properties.5 The study of strongly first order and safe
dependencies, to which this paper contributes, is a promising subtopic of this
intriguing and largely unexplored field of research.
2As proved in [15] these families of dependencies are both strongly first order, as is their
union.
3This property is related to the relativization operator of [38].
4Indeed, when studying the properties of a new type of semantics, it is a good strategy
to begin by identifying and investigating logics that make use of it and are of independent
interest.
5For examples of works along these lines, see for instance [15] or [29].
3
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Team Semantics and Dependencies
As mentioned in the Introduction, Team Semantics generalizes Tarskian seman-
tics for First Order Logic by letting formulas be satisfied or not satisfied by sets
of assignments, which are called teams for historical reasons:
Definition 2.1 (Team). Let M be a first order model (over any signature Σ)
with domain M and let V be a finite set of variables. Then a team X over M
with domain Dom(X) = V is a set of variable assignments s : V →M over M.
There exists an obvious correspondence between teams and relations:
Definition 2.2 (Teams to Relations). Let X be a team over some model M,
and let t = t1 . . . tn be a finite tuple of terms in the signature ofM with variables
in Dom(X). Then we write X(t) for the n-ary relation
X(t) = {〈tM1 (s), t
M
2 (s), . . . , t
M
n (s)〉 : s ∈ X}.
where each tMi (s) is the interpretation of ti in M for the assignment s.
Teams can be restricted to a subset of the variables in their domain in the
obvious way:
Definition 2.3 (Team Restriction). Let X be a team over some model M and
let V ⊆ Dom(X) be a subset of the variables in its domain. Then we write X|V
for the restriction of X to the variables in V , that is for
X|V = {s|V : s ∈ X}
where, for all assignments s ∈ X , s|V is the unique assignment with domain V
such that s|V (v) = s(v) for all variables v ∈ V .
It will also be useful, in several places of this work, to consider the subteam
of a given team which contains only the assignments satisfying (in the sense of
the usual Tarskian Semantics) some first order formula θ. This is defined in the
obvious way:
Definition 2.4 (Team Selection). Let X be a team over some model M and
let θ(x) be a first order formula over the signature of M whose free variables
Free(θ) are contained in the domain Dom(X) of X . Then
X ↾ θ(x) = {s ∈ X : M |=s θ(x)}
where the expression M |=s θ(x) means that the assignment s satisfies θ(x) in
M according to the usual Tarskian Semantics.
Finally, in order to define Team Semantics we will also need the two following
operations:
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X =
v0
s0 0
s1 1
H(s) =
{
{〈1, 0〉} if s = s0
{〈0, 0〉, 〈0, 1〉} if s = s1
X [H/v1v2] =
v0 v1 v2
s′0 0 1 0
s′1 1 0 0
s′2 1 0 1
X [M/v1v2] =
v0 v1 v2
s′′0 0 0 0
s′′1 0 0 1
s′′2 0 1 0
s′′3 0 1 1
s′′4 1 0 0
s′′5 1 0 1
s′′6 1 1 0
s′′7 1 1 1
Figure 1: Supplementation and duplication examples in a model with only two
elements 0 and 1.
Definition 2.5 ((Lax) Supplementation and Duplication). Let X be a team
over some first order model M and let H : X → P(Mk)\{∅} be a function
associating to each assignment s ∈ X some nonempty set H(s) ⊆ Mk of k-
tuples of possible values, and let v = v1 . . . vk be any k-tuple of pairwise distinct
variable symbols (which may or may not occur already in Dom(X)). Then we
write X [H/v] for the team, with domain Dom(X) ∪ {vi : i = 1 . . . k}, defined as
X [H/v] = {s[m/v] : s ∈ X,m ∈ H(s)}
where, as usual, s[m/v] is the assignment obtained starting from s and fixing
the values of the variables v = v1 . . . vk to m = m1 . . .mk. This team is called
the supplementation of X along H .
For everym ∈Mk, we also write X [m/v] for the set {s[m/v] : s ∈ X}, that
is for the supplementation of X along v via some H with H(s) = {m} for all
s ∈ X .
Finally, we write X [M/v] for the largest possible supplementation of X ,
which is also called the duplication of X and which extends X by assigning all
possible values to the variables in v:
X [M/v] = {s[m/v] : s ∈ X,m ∈Mk}
The reason why the above supplementation operation is described as “lax”
is because there also exists in the literature a “strict” version, in which H(s)
is a singleton for every s ∈ X . As discussed in [13], the choice between these
two operations (as well as between two possible semantics for disjunction) cor-
responds precisely to the choice between allowing or disallowing nondeterminis-
tic strategies in the equivalent imperfect-information game-theoretic semantics;
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however, when considering non downwards-closed dependencies, the strict vari-
ant of Team Semantics can fail to satisfy locality (Proposition 2.13 in this work)
in the sense that the satisfiability of a formula φ in a team X may depend on the
values taken in X by variables which do not appear free in φ. Because of this,
in this work (as in most of the recent literature in the area of Team Semantics)
we will focus only on the lax version of the semantics.
Definition 2.6 ((Lax) Team Semantics for First Order Logic). LetM be a first
order model, let X be a team over it, and let φ(x) be a first order formula in
Negation Normal Form6 over the signature of M such that the free variables of
φ are contained in the domain of X . Then we say that X satisfies φ in M, and
write M |=X φ, if and only if this follows from the following rules:
TS-lit If α is a first order literal then M |=X α if and only if, for all s ∈ X ,
M |=s α according to the usual rules of Tarskian Semantics;
TS-∨ For all formulas ψ1 and ψ2, M |=X ψ1 ∨ ψ2 if and only if there exist
teams Y and Z such that X = Y ∪ Z, M |=Y ψ1 and M |=Z ψ2;7
TS-∧ For all formulas ψ1 and ψ2, M |=X ψ1 ∧ ψ2 if and only if M |=X ψ1 and
M |=X ψ2;
TS-∃ For all formulas ψ and all variables v, M |=X ∃vψ if and only if there
exists some H : X → P(M)\{∅} such that M |=X[H/v] ψ;
TS-∀ For all formulas ψ and all variables v,M |=X ∀vψ if and only ifM |=X[M/v]
ψ.
Given a first order model M and a negation normal form, first order sentence
φ over its signature, we say that φ is true in M in Team Semantics, and write
M |= φ, if and only if M |={ǫ} φ, where {ǫ} is the team containing the unique
assignment ǫ over the empty domain.
6It is possible to define Team Semantics for expressions not in Negation Normal Form, as it
was done for instance in [39]. However, doing so requires taking track of positive and negative
satisfaction conditions, which makes the semantics more cumbersome; and, as discussed in [33],
the usual (“dual”) negation operator has little semantic meaning in certain Team Semantics-
based extensions of First Order Logic, as the satisfaction conditions of a formula and of its
negation are essentially unrelated. Furthermore, it is often unclear what the interpretation of
the dual negation of a dependency atom should be: for instance, in [39] it was decided that
the negations of functional dependence atoms =(x;y) are only satisfied by empty teams, that
is they are all equivalent to ⊥. For this reason, in this work we will assume that all expressions
are in Negation Normal Form. Another possible negation operator, of clearer interpretation
in Team Semantics, is the contradictory negation M |=X∼ φ ⇔ M 6|=X φ; but adding it to
First Order Logic together with even very simple dependencies (e.g. constancy atoms) brings
the expressive power of the resulting formalism all the way up to Second Order Logic. The
logic FO(∼) obtained by taking First Order Logic (with Team Semantics) and adding to it the
contradictory negation (but no dependencies) is however equivalent to First Order Logic wrt
sentences, as shown in [16], and in [36] an axiomatization for it is found. This operator will
not be further discussed in this work.
7In this rule we do not require that Y ∩Z = ∅. Doing that would give us the strict semantics
for disjunction, which – as in the case of supplementation and existential quantification –
corresponds to allowing only deterministic strategies in the game theoretic semantics and
would result in the failure of Proposition 2.13 for certain non-downwards closed dependencies.
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The following two widely known facts describe completely the relationship
between Team Semantics and Tarskian Semantics for First Order Logic:
Proposition 2.7. Let M be a first order model, let X be a team over it, and let
φ(x) ∈ FO be a first order formula over the signature of M and with free variables
in Dom(X). Then M |=X φ(x) if and only if, for all assignments s ∈ X, M |=s φ
according to the usual Tarskian Semantics.
Proof. Straightforward induction.
Proposition 2.8. Let M be a first order model and let φ ∈ FO be a first order
sentence over the signature of M. Then M |= φ in the sense of Team Semantics
if and only if M |= φ in the sense of Tarskian Semantics.
Proof. By definition, M |= φ in the sense of Team Semantics if and only if
M |={ǫ} φ. By Proposition 2.7, this is the case if and only if M |=ǫ φ in the
sense of Tarskian Semantics. This holds if and only if φ is true in M according
to Tarskian Semantics.
Do these two results show that Team Semantics is a pointlessly overwrought,
but practically equivalent, variant of Tarskian semantics? Well, no: as men-
tioned in the Introduction, the richer structure of the satisfaction relation in
Team Semantics makes it possible to extend First Order Logic in new ways. In
Team Semantics, the satisfaction conditions of a first order formula φ(x) always
correspond to some first order definable property of relations, in the sense that
there exists some first order sentence φ′(R), where R is a relation symbol not in
the signature of M, such that M |=X φ(x) if and only if M[X(x)/R] |= φ′(R)8:
indeed, by Proposition 2.7, it suffices to take φ′(R) := ∀x(Rx → φ(x)). How-
ever, a moment’s thought shows that there exist first order definable properties
of relations that do not correspond to the satisfaction conditions of any first
order formula in Team Semantics. For instance,
Corollary 2.9. There is no first order formula φ(x) such that M |=X φ(x) if
and only if |X(x)| ≤ 1, that is, if and only if the variable x takes at most one
value in X.
Thus, it is possible to extend the Team Semantics of First Order Logic by
introducing new types of atoms, such as the following constancy atoms:
Definition 2.10 (Constancy Atoms, Constancy Logic). Constancy Logic
FO(=(·)) is the logic obtained by adding to the language of First Order Logic
(in Negation Normal Form) constancy atoms = (x) for all variables x, with
satisfaction conditions
TS-const M |=X=(x) if and only if |X(x)| ≤ 1.
8Here we writeM[X(t)/R] for the first order model obtained by adding the relation symbol
R to M – if it is not present already – and fixing the relation X(t) = {s(t) : s ∈ X} as its
interpretation.
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It is then possible to inquire about the properties of this Constancy Logic.
For example, by Corollary 2.9 we know already that there exist formulas in
constancy logic which are not equivalent to any first order formula; but what
about sentences? Can Constancy Logic be used to define classes of models
which are not definable in First Order Logic? As shown in [13], the answer is
no. However, this is the case for the following atoms and for the logics that
they characterize:
Definition 2.11 (Functional Dependence, Independence, and Inclusion).
Dependence Logic, Independence Logic, and Inclusion Logic are the logics ob-
tained by adding to the language of First Order Logic (in Negation Normal
Form) functional dependence atoms =(x;y), independence atoms x⊥yz, and
inclusion atoms x ⊆ y respectively, with the following semantics:
TS-dep M |=X=(x;y) iff for any two s, s′ ∈ X , if s(x) = s′(x) then
s(y) = s′(y);
TS-indep M |=X x⊥yz iff for any two s, s′ ∈ X with s(y) = s′(y) there exists
some s′′ ∈ X such that s′′(xy) = s(xy) and s′′(yz) = s′(yz);
TS-inc M |=X x ⊆ y iff for any s ∈ X there exists some s′ ∈ X such that
s(x) = s′(y).
As shown in [39], [20] and [19] respectively, Dependence Logic and Indepen-
dence Logic are equivalent to Existential Second Order Logic ESO over sentences,
while Inclusion Logic is equivalent to the positive fragment of Greatest Fixed
Point Logic9. This is the case despite the fact that the satisfaction conditions of
the above atoms are easily definable as first order properties of relations; and, as
mentioned in the Introduction, the fact that Team Semantics allows to greatly
increase the expressive power of First Order Logic via first order definable prop-
erties is precisely what makes it an eminently suitable tool for the study of the
boundary between first order and higher order logics. Additionally, it is worth
remarking here that these dependencies have clear connections with database
theory: the relationship between functional dependence and inclusion atoms
and the functional [6, 1] and inclusion [3] dependencies of database theory is
obvious, and as discussed in [10] there likewise exists a correspondence between
independence atoms and database-theoretic multivalued dependencies [12]. Ad-
ditionally, these atoms have a strong doxastic flavour: if a team X represents
the set of the states of things that an agent believes possible then =(x,y) can
be read as “if I learned the true value of x, I could infer the value of y”, while
x⊥yz can be read as “if I learned the true value of y, the value of x would give
me no information whatsoever regarding the value of z” and x ⊆ y can be read
as “every possible value for x is also a possible value for y”. As discussed in
[14], all the connectives and operators of Team Semantics also admit natural
9This implies, in particular, that Inclusion Logic captures PTIME over finite ordered mod-
els.
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interpretations in terms of the dynamics of belief states; but we will not pursue
this line of thought any further in this work.
A very fruitful research direction in Team Semantics research so far has con-
sisted in the study of the properties of these logics and of fragments thereof (see
e.g. [27, 8, 13, 19, 18, 34, 21, 22, 9]). This is a valuable topic of investigation,
with rich connections with open problems in the classification of better known
fragments of Second Order Logic and in descriptive complexity theory. Further-
more, as briefly mentioned above, these logics are of independent interest, and
hence their properties and those of their fragments are deserving of study for
their own sake.
The present work is a contribution to a different – if obviously related – re-
search programme, one in which the central topic of investigation is not Depen-
dence Logic or Independence Logic or any other specific Team Semantics-based
logic per se but ratherTeam Semantics itself ; and, under this perspective, rather
than selecting “interesting” additional atoms and studying the logics obtained
by adding them to First Order Logic we want to select “interesting” properties
for Team Semantics-based logics and investigate which atoms (or more in gen-
eral which operators, although as we will see there are plenty of open questions
even in the more limited case of atoms) or collections of atoms satisfy them if
added to the language of First Order Logic.
In order to do this properly, we must first clarify exactly what a dependency
atom is in Team Semantics. The following definition, from [35], is a natural
starting point:
Definition 2.12 (Dependency). For any k ∈ N, a k-ary dependency D is a class
of models over the signature {R} which is closed under isomorphisms, where R
is a k-ary relation symbol.
Given a family of dependencies D = {Di : i ∈ I}, we write FO(D) for the
logic obtained by adding to the language of First Order Logic (in Negation
Normal Form) all dependency atoms Dt, where D ∈ D and t is a tuple of terms
of length equal to the arity of D. The Team Semantics for FO(D) is defined
precisely as in Definition 2.6, with the additional condition
TS-D For all models M with domain M , all teams X over M, all D ∈ D and
all tuples t of terms in the signature of M with variables in the domain
of X and of length equal to the arity of D, M |=X Dt if and only if
〈M,X(t)〉 ∈ D.10
The following result, that can be found in [29] together with a number of
results concerning the complexity of the satisfiability problem for fragments of
logics with generalized dependencies, shows that – regardless of the choice of D
– FO(D) is local in the sense that the values of variables which do not appear
free in a formula are irrelevant to its satisfaction or lack thereof:
10In this work we identify the tuple 〈M,R1 . . . Rn〉 with the model M with domain M and
relations R1 . . . Rn. When no ambiguity regarding the choice of model is possible, as in this
case, we also use the same symbol Ri for the relation symbol and for its interpretation RMi .
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Proposition 2.13 (Locality). Let D be any family of dependencies, let φ be a
formula of FO(D), and let Free(φ) be the set of its free variables. Then, for all
models M whose signature contains that of φ and for all teams X with domain
containing Free(φ),
M |=X φ⇔M |=X|Free(φ) φ.
Proof. By structural induction.
It is easy to verify that all the dependency atoms discussed so far are spe-
cial cases of Definition 2.12. Note, furthermore, that nothing in Definition 2.12
requires the class D to be first order definable. For instance, U = {〈M,R〉 :
|R| is uncountable}11 is a perfectly acceptable unary dependency, and the cor-
responding satisfaction condition in Team Semantics is: M |=X Ut if and only
if X(t) is uncountable.
If, as in the case of U, the satisfaction conditions of a dependency atom
D are not first order definable then obviously not all sentences of FO(D) are
equivalent to first order sentences: indeed, it is easy to see that the FO(D)
sentence ∀x(¬Rx∨ (Rx∧Dx)) characterizes precisely the class D, which is not
first order definable by assumption. A more interesting case is the one in which
D – understood as a class of models – is first order definable:
Definition 2.14 (First Order Dependencies). A k-ary dependency D is first
order if there exists some sentence φ(R) in the signature {R}, where R is k-ary,
such that D = {〈M,R〉 : 〈M,R〉 |= φ(R)}.
Proposition 2.15. Constancy atoms, functional dependence atoms, indepen-
dence atoms and inclusion atoms are all first order.
Proof. Choose for φ(R) the expressions ∀xx′(Rx ∧Rx′ → x = x′),
∀xx′y(Rxy ∧Rx′y→ x = x′), ∀xx′yzz′(Rxyz ∧Rx′yz′ → Rxyz′) and
∀xy(Rxy → ∃zRzx) respectively.
The following properties, well studied in the literature, provide a useful
starting point for the classification of dependencies:
Definition 2.16 (Closure Properties for Dependencies). Let D be any depen-
dency. Then
• D has the empty team property if, for all sets of elements M , 〈M, ∅〉 ∈ D;
• D is downwards closed if for all relations R over a domainM , 〈M,R〉 ∈ D
and Q ⊆ R imply 〈M,Q〉 ∈ D;
• D is upwards closed if for all relations R over some domainM , 〈M,R〉 ∈ D
and Q ⊇ R imply 〈M,Q〉 ∈ D;
11Strictly speaking, this is not a set but a proper class since M ranges over all possible
(uncountable) sets of elements. This is not a problem for the purposes of this work – see
Definition 2.12 – and we will use expressions such as the above for defining the interpretations
of dependencies.
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• D is union closed if for all families {Ri : i ∈ I} of relations of the same
arity over the same domainM such that 〈M,Ri〉 ∈ D for all i ∈ I we have
that 〈M,
⋃
iRi〉 ∈ D as well.
Aside from upwards closure, these properties are preserved by Team Seman-
tics in the following sense:
Proposition 2.17. Let D be a family of dependencies and let φ(x) be any for-
mula of FO(D). Then, for all models M with signature containing the signature
of φ(x),
1. If all D ∈ D have the empty team property then M |=∅ φ;
2. If all D ∈ D are downwards closed and X is a team such that M |=X φ
then M |=Y φ for all Y ⊆ X;
3. If all D ∈ D are union closed and (Xi : i ∈ I) is a family of teams such
that M |=Xi φ for all i ∈ I then M |=
⋃
iXi
φ.
Proof. Straightforward induction.
Closure properties such as these are useful to establish nondefinability rela-
tions between dependencies.
Definition 2.18 (Definability of Dependencies). LetD be a family of dependen-
cies and let E be another dependency. Then E is said to be definable in FO(D)
if for all tuples t of terms there exists some formula φ(t) such that M |=X Et
if and only if M |=X φ(t).12
It is easy to verify that the dependencies discussed thus far all have the
empty team property; that none of them is upwards closed; that constancy
and functional dependency are downwards closed but not union closed; that
inclusion is union closed but not downwards closed; and that independence is
neither union closed nor downwards closed. By Proposition 2.17, this allows us
to infer at once for example that neither inclusion nor functional dependence
are definable in terms of the other, and that neither of them alone suffices to
define independence.13
It follows from known results in the literature that functional dependence
atoms, inclusion atoms and independence atoms are “maximal” among the cor-
responding classes of first order dependencies. More precisely, for all first order
dependencies D,
1. If D has the empty team property and is downwards closed then it is
definable in terms of functional dependence atoms ([32]);
12The choice of t may force us to rename bound variables in φ; but aside from that, it is
not difficult to see that if such a φ exists then it works for any t.
13However, as shown in [13], independence atoms are definable if we have both inclusion
atoms and functional dependence atoms.
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2. If D has the empty team property then it is definable in terms of inde-
pendence atoms ([13]);
3. If D has the empty team property and is union closed then it is definable
in terms of inclusion atoms ([19]).
In fact, the results concerning functional dependence atoms and independence
atoms are stronger, in that they also hold for existential second order (rather
than first order) dependencies D.14 This is not, however, the case for Inclusion
Logic: while all first order union-closed dependencies with the empty team
property are definable in it, as discussed in [19] it is possible to find existential
second order union-closed dependencies with the empty team property which
are not definable in Inclusion Logic.
We conclude this section by providing a few definitions and elementary re-
sults that will be used in this work.
Definition 2.19 (∃v and ∀v). Let v = v1 . . . vk be a tuple of pairwise dis-
tinct variables. Then, for all formulas φ, we write ∃vφ as a shorthand for
∃v1∃v2 . . .∃vkφ, and we write ∀vφ as a shorthand for ∀v1∀v2 . . . ∀vkφ.
Proposition 2.20. For all models M, all families of dependencies D, all for-
mulas φ ∈ FO(D), all tuples v = v1 . . . vk of variables, all models M whose
domain contains the signature of φ and all teams X whose domain contains
Free(φ)\{v1 . . . vk}
M |=X ∃vφ⇔ there is a H : X → P(M
k)\{∅} s.t. M |=X[H/v] φ
and
M |=X ∀vφ⇔M |=X[M/v] φ.
Proof. Trivial induction on the length k of the tuple v.
Definition 2.21 (Selective Implication). For all families of dependencies D, all
formulas φ ∈ FO(D) and all first order formulas θ ∈ FO, we write θ →֒ φ as a
shorthand for (¬θ) ∨ (θ ∧ φ) where ¬θ is the first order negation normal form
expression equivalent to the negation of θ.
Proposition 2.22. For all models M, all teams X, all families of dependencies
D, all formulas φ ∈ FO(D) and all formulas θ ∈ FO,
M |=X θ →֒ φ⇔M |=X↾θ φ.
Proof. Follows easily from Proposition 2.7 and from the rule for disjunction in
Team Semantics.
14Analogously to Definition 2.14, a dependency D is existential second order if there exists
some ESO sentence φ(R) such that D = {〈M,R〉 : 〈M,R〉 |= φ(R)}.
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Definition 2.23 (Boolean Disjunction). Let φ, ψ ∈ FO(D) for some choice of
D. Then we write φ ⊔ ψ for the FO(D ∪ {=(·)})-formula
∃z1z2(=(z1)∧ =(z2) ∧ ((z1 = z2 ∧ φ) ∨ (z1 6= z2 ∧ ψ)))
where z1 and z2 are two new variables not occurring in φ or ψ and =(zi) is the
constancy atom of Definition 2.10, which holds in a team X if and only if zi
takes at most one value in it.
Proposition 2.24. For all models M, all families of dependencies with the
empty team property D, all formulas φ, ψ ∈ FO(D) and all teams X,
M |=X φ ⊔ ψ ⇔M |=X φ or M |=X ψ.
Proof. Straightforward from definitions (observe, however, that the requirement
that all D ∈ D have the empty team property cannot be removed).
Proposition 2.25 (Positive Occurrences of Relations). Let D be any family of
dependencies and let φ be any formula of FO(D) in which some relation symbol
R occurs only positively.15 Then φ is upwards closed in R, in the sense that
M |=X φ,R
M ⊆ Q⇒M[Q/R] |=X φ
for all suitable models M, teams X and relations Q.
Proof. Trivial by structural induction.
2.2 Strongly First Order and Safe Dependencies
As already mentioned, in [13] it was shown that the constancy atoms of Defini-
tion 2.10 do not increase the expressive power of First Order Logic with respect
to sentences, in the sense that every sentence of the logic FO(=(·)) obtained
by adding these atoms to First Order Logic is equivalent to some first order
sentence. In other words, First Order Logic is not a natural “stopping point”
in the family of the logics based on Team Semantics, as it is possible to find
expressions (e.g. constancy atoms) that as per Corollary 2.9 cannot be defined
in terms of it but however do not add to the expressive power of its sentences.
Thus, we say that constancy atoms are strongly first order according to the
following definition:
Definition 2.26 (Strongly First Order Dependencies and Families). Let D be
a family of first order dependencies. Then D is strongly first order if every
sentence of FO(D) is equivalent to some first order sentence.
A single dependency D is said to be strongly first order if the singleton {D}
is strongly first order in the above sense.
15Since all our expressions are in Negation Normal Form, this is the same as saying that no
negated literal ¬Rt appears in φ.
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Constancy atoms are not the only strongly first order dependencies, and the
logic FO(=(·)) is not a natural “stopping point” in the above sense16 either. This
follows at once from the following result from [15]:
Theorem 2.27. Let D↑ be the family of all first order upwards closed depen-
dencies. Then the family D↑ ∪ {=(·)}, which contains all those dependencies
and also constancy atoms, is strongly first order.
Using this result, it is not difficult to find additional strongly first order
dependencies. For instance, as mentioned in [15], the contradictory negations
of inclusion dependencies
M |=X x 6⊆ y⇔ ∃s ∈ X∀s
′ ∈ Xs(x) 6= s′(y)
are all strongly first order, since they are definable (in the sense of Definition
2.18) in terms of constancy atoms and upwards closed dependencies. To the
knowledge of the author all strongly first order dependencies known so far are
also definable in terms of FO(D↑,=(·)).17 This justifies the following
Conjecture 1: A dependency D is strongly first order if and only if it is de-
finable in FO(D↑,=(·)).
As already mentioned, the main result of this work will be the proof of a
special case of this conjecture.
In [17], the notion of strong first orderness was generalized to the following
notion of safety:
Definition 2.28 (Safe Dependencies and Families). Let L be a logic based on
Team Semantics18 and let E be a family of dependencies. Then E is safe for L
if every sentence of L(E) is equivalent to some sentence of L.
A single dependency E is said to be safe for L if the singleton {E} is safe
for L in the above sense.
A dependency E or a dependency family E is said to be safe for a dependency
D or for a dependency family D if it is safe for the logic FO(D) (resp. FO(D)).
By definition, a dependency (or a family of dependencies) is strongly first
order if and only if it is safe for FO. The notion of safety can be used to make
precise the informal concept of “natural stopping point” mentioned above:
Definition 2.29 (Definitionally Closed Logic). A logic L, based on Team Se-
mantics, is definitionally closed if and only if the following two properties are
equivalent for all dependencies D:
16This notion will be made more precise in a moment.
17We commit a minor abuse of notation and write FO(D↑,=(·)) rather than FO(D↑∪{=(·)}).
18For the purposes of this work, we can always assume that L is of the form FO(D) for some
choice of D; but nothing prevents applying this definition to another logic – for instance, to
some fragment of First Order Logic or to some extension of it by additional connectives and
operators.
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1. D is safe for L;
2. D is definable in L.
Thus, Corollary 2.9 and the fact that constancy is strongly first order imply
at once that First Order Logic is not definitionally closed, while Conjecture 1
would have as a direct consequence that FO(D↑,=(·)) is definitionally closed (and
is, in fact, the only “definitional closure” of FO). More in general, a full char-
acterization of the definitionally closed extensions of First Order Logic would
be a very valuable contribution to the classification of logics based on Team
Semantics.
Safety, however, is a delicate property: in particular, as shown in [17], con-
stancy dependencies are not safe for FO(⊆1), where ⊆1 is the family of only
unary inclusion dependencies19, despite being as already mentioned strongly
first order (that is, safe for FO). Thus, a dependency D may be safe for a logic
L but unsafe for some other logic L′ which strictly contains L. This is reminis-
cent of certain phenomena in the theory of second-order generalized quantifiers
[28],20 and it suggests that the problem of fully characterizing safety relations
and definitionally closed logics will not be of easy solution.
Nonetheless, studying the properties of safety is a fruitful endeavour. In
particular, in this work we will prove that strongly first order dependencies are
safe for FO(D) whenever D contains only downwards closed dependencies, and
use this result to prove – as already mentioned – a special case of Conjecture
1.
2.3 Relativizable Dependencies
Sometimes it may be necessary to check whether a dependency holds not with
respect to the current model, but with respect to some submodel thereof. This
justifies the following definitions:21
Definition 2.30 (Relativized Dependencies). Let P be any unary relation sym-
bol, let D be any k-ary dependency, and let t be a tuple of terms of length k.
Then for all first order models M and all teams X over M with the variables
that appear in t in their domain, M |=X DP t if and only if
1. For all t ∈ t, X(t) ⊆ PM;22
2. 〈PM, X(t)〉 ∈ D.
Definition 2.31 (Relativizable Dependencies). A dependencyD is relativizable
if every sentence of FO(DP ) is equivalent to some sentence of FO(D) over the
same signature.
19More precisely, FO(⊆1) adds to First Order Logic all inclusion atoms v1 ⊆ v2, where v1
and v2 are single variables (not tuples of variables).
20The author thanks an anonymous reviewer for pointing out this connection.
21This notion of relativization of dependencies is closely related to the notion of relativiza-
tion of formulas in Inclusion-Exclusion Logic discussed by Ro¨nnholm in [38].
22This condition is actually a consequence of the next one, but we state it explicitly for
clarity.
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It follows from the above definitions that if D is relativizable and strongly
first order then every sentence constructed out of relativized dependency atoms
DP t and first order connectives and literals is equivalent to some first order
sentence.
All the dependency atoms widely studied in the literature – functional de-
pendence, inclusion, independence and so on – are relativizable. This can be
verified by observing that they have the following, stronger property:
Definition 2.32 (Closed-World Dependencies). A dependency D is closed
world if, for all sets of elements M and all relations R, if M ′ = {m ∈M : ∃a ∈
R s.t. m ∈ a} is the set of all elements occurring in any tuple of R then
〈M,R〉 ∈ D⇔ 〈M ′, R〉 ∈ D.
This notion is related to the closed-world assumption employed in database
theory and knowledge representation, and it is also similar (albeit not identical)
to the notion of dependencies closed under substructures of [29]: in short, if D
is closed-world the validity of some atom Dv in a team X cannot be affected
by the existence (or non-existence) in the model of elements that do not appear
as possible values of v in X .
It is easy to see that the dependencies examined so far are all closed-world.
A first order, unary dependency notion that is not closed-world is non-totality
nt = {〈M,P 〉 : P 6= M}, corresponding to the atoms M |=X nt(t) ⇔ X(t) 6=
M . Indeed, if 〈M,P 〉 ∈ nt and we restrict M to the set M ′ of the elements
which occur in P then (M ′, P ) 6∈ nt. However, non-totality is definable in terms
of constancy, which is closed-world:
M |=X nt(t)⇔M |=X ∃z(=(z) ∧ z 6= t).
Furthermore, despite not being closed-world, non-totality is still relativizable:
indeed, it is straightforward to check that ntP (t) is logically equivalent to Pt∧
∀x((x = t ∨ ¬Px) →֒ nt(x)).23
Proposition 2.33. If a dependency D is closed world then it is relativizable.
Proof. If D is closed world and all elements that appear in X(v) are in P ,
M |=X D
Pv⇔ 〈P,X(v)〉 ∈ D
⇔ 〈M ′, X(v)〉 ∈ D
⇔ 〈M,X(v)〉 ∈ D⇔M |=X Dv
where M ′ = {s(vi) : s ∈ X, vi ∈ v} is the set of all values that variables in v
take in X . Thus, DPv is definable in FO(D) simply as
(∧
vi∈v
Pvi
)
∧Dv, and
hence D is relativizable.
23See Definition 2.21 and Proposition 2.22 for the interpretation of the selective implication
→֒. The intuition here is that we force x to take all values outside P as well as all possible
values of t: so if x does not take all possible values, there must be some value inside P that t
does not take.
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As we saw, it is easy to find dependencies which are not closed-world, like
non-totality. However, it is less obvious to find examples of dependencies that
are not relativizable, which led the author to pose the following
Problem (Solved by Fausto Barbero): Find a dependency D that is not
relativizable, or prove that all dependencies are relativizable.
Fausto Barbero, in a personal communication, pointed out that a counting
argument shows that there exist dependencies (not necessarily first order) that
are not relativizable. A concrete example is given by the unary dependency
I∞ = {〈M,P 〉 : M is infinite}, for which M |=X I∞(v) iff the model M is infi-
nite regardless of X . Indeed, the FO(IP∞) sentence ∃vI
P
∞(v) is true if and only
if P is infinite. However, there is no FO(I∞) sentence over the signature {P}
that satisfies this property, because in an infinite model every occurrence I∞(v)
of I∞ is equivalent to ⊤ and a standard back-and-forth argument shows that
there is no first order sentence which is true in an infinite model if and only if
P is infinite. The following variant of the above problem is, to the knowledge of
the author, still open, and if solved it would suffice to remove the requirement
of relativizability from the results of this paper:
Open Problem: Find a strongly first order dependency D which is not rela-
tivizable, or prove that all such dependencies are relativizable.
3 Strongly first order dependencies are safe for
downwards closed dependencies
As already mentioned, constancy dependencies are strongly first order – that is,
safe for FO – but they are not safe for unary inclusion dependencies. However,
in this section, we will see that strongly first order dependencies are safe for
downwards closed dependencies. Let us begin by recalling an easy variant of
Lyndon’s Theorem:
Proposition 3.1. Let θ(S1 . . . Sn) be a first order sentence in a signature con-
taining the symbols S1 . . . Sn (and possibly others) which is upwards closed in
all Si, in the sense that, for any model M, if M |= θ(S1 . . . Sn) and S′i ⊇ Si for
all i then M |= θ(S′1 . . . S
′
n) Then θ(S1 . . . Sn) is equivalent to some first order
θ′(S1 . . . Sn) in which all Si occur only positively.
Proof. Recall (see e.g. Theorem 8.3.3 of [25]) that if θ is not equivalent to any
formula in which the Si occur only positively
24 then it is not preserved under
bijective homomorphisms that fix all relations other than S1 . . . Sn: therefore,
there exist two models A and B such that A |= φ, B 6|= φ, and there is a
bijective homomorphism h : A→ B that fixes all relations other than S1 . . . Sn.
24But in which the identity symbol may occur positively or negatively - this is necessary to
guarantee bijectivity.
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For all i = 1 . . . n, let Ti = h[S
A
i ] be the image of S
A
i under h. Then since h
is a homomorphism, Ti ⊆ SBi ; since h is bijective and fixes all other relations,
B[T1 . . . Tn/S1 . . . Sn] is isomorphic to A, and hence B |= φ(T1 . . . Tn); and thus,
since by hypothesis B 6|= φ(S1 . . . Sn), φ is not upwards closed in S1 . . . Sn.
The main idea of this section will be to “extract” the downwards closed
dependency atoms Dt (D ∈ D) from a sentence φ ∈ FO(D,S), leaving only
a sentence of FO(S); then use the fact that S is strongly first order to find an
equivalent first order sentence; and finally add back the dependencies previously
removed.
The following lemmas show how to do the first step of this procedure:
Lemma 3.2. Let φ be a FO(D) formula, where D is a set of dependencies
{D0,D1, . . .} such that D0 is downwards closed. Suppose furthermore that S is
a new relation symbol with the same arity k as D0, and let φ
∗(S) be the formula
obtained by replacing a single instance D0t of D0 with St. Then for all models
M with signature containing the signature of φ and for all teams X with domain
containing the free variables of φ, M |=X φ if and only if there exists a relation
S ⊆Mk such that 〈M,S〉 ∈ D0 and M |=X φ∗(S).
Proof. By structural induction on φ:
• If φ is of the formD0t then φ∗(S) is simply St. Suppose that M |=X D0t;
then for S = X(t) we have that 〈M,S〉 ∈ D0 and M |=X St, as required.
Conversely, suppose that such a S exists. Then since M |=X St we have
that X(t) ⊆ S; but then, since D0 is downwards closed and 〈M,S〉 ∈ D0
we have that 〈M,X(t)〉 ∈ D0 as well, and hence M |=X D0t as required.
• If φ is of the form ψ1 ∨ψ2 then – assuming without loss of generality that
the instance of D0 which we are replacing is in ψ1 – φ
∗(S) is ψ∗1(S) ∨ ψ2.
Then M |=X ψ1 ∨ ψ2 iff X = Y ∪Z for two Y, Z such that M |=Y ψ1 and
M |=Z ψ2 iff (by induction hypothesis) there exist a relation S and two
Y , Z such that 〈M,S〉 ∈ D0, X = Y ∪ Z, M |=Y ψ∗1(S) and M |=Z ψ2
iff there exists a relation S such that 〈M,S〉 ∈ D0 and M |=X φ∗(S), as
required.
• If φ is of the form ψ1 ∧ψ2 then – assuming without loss of generality that
the instance of D0 which we are replacing is in ψ1 – φ
∗(S) is ψ∗1(S) ∧ ψ2.
Then M |=X φ iff M |=X ψ1 and M |=X ψ2 iff (by induction hypothesis)
there is some S such that 〈M,S〉 ∈ D0, M |=X ψ∗1(S) and M |=X ψ2 iff
there is some S such that 〈M,S〉 ∈ D0 and M |=X φ∗(S).
• If φ is of the form ∃vψ then φ∗(S) is ∃vψ∗(S). Then M |=X φ iff there
exists some H such that M |=X[H/v] ψ iff there exist some S and H such
that 〈M,S〉 ∈ D0 and M |=X[H/v] ψ
∗(S) iff there exists some S such that
〈M,S〉 ∈ D0 and M |= φ
∗(S).
• If φ is of the form ∀vψ then φ∗(S) is ∀vψ∗(S). Then M |=X φ iff
M |=X[M/v] ψ iff there exists some S such that 〈M,S〉 ∈ D0 andM |=X[M/v]
ψ∗(S) iff there exists some S such that 〈M,S〉 ∈ D0 and M |= φ∗(S).
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Lemma 3.3. Let S be a strongly first order family of dependencies, let D be
a set of downwards closed dependencies, and let φ be a sentence of FO(S,D).
Then there exists a first order sentence χ(S1 . . . Sn), whose signature contains
the signature of φ as well as new relation symbols S1 . . . Sn, and dependencies
Dj(1) . . .Dj(n) ∈ D such that, for all models M, M |= φ if and only if there
exist relations S1 . . . Sn such that
• For all i = 1 . . . n, 〈M,Si〉 ∈ Dj(i);
• M |= χ(S1 . . . Sn).
Moreover, all Si occur only positively in χ.
Proof. Starting from φ, we can apply iteratively the previous lemma to remove
all instances of dependencies D ∈ D from φ. In this way, we obtain a sentence
θ(S1 . . . Sn) in FO(S) which – aside from being in FO(S) rather than in FO –
would satisfy our requirements.25 But since S is a strongly first order family of
dependencies, θ(S1 . . . Sn) is logically equivalent to some first order χ(S1 . . . Sn).
Furthermore, since the Si occur only positively in θ by Proposition 2.25 it is
the case that θ is upwards closed in all Si, and hence so is χ, and hence – by
Proposition 3.1 – we can also require that all Si occur only positively in χ.
Note that there is no guarantee that the first order sentence χ(S1 . . . Sn)
obtained via Lemma 3.3 would contain only one occurrence of each symbol
Si, as the translation from FO(S) to FO may introduce additional occurrences.
However, as we will now see, as long as the Si occur only positively this can be
dealt with:
Lemma 3.4. Let D be a downwards closed dependency, let χ(S) be a first order
formula where S is a relational symbol that occurs only positively in χ, and let
χ′(W1 . . .Wn) be the formula obtained by replacing each occurrence of S in χ
with a different new symbolWi. Then the following are equivalent for all suitable
models M and assignments s:
1. There exists some S such that 〈M,S〉 ∈ D and M |= χ(S);
2. There exist W1 . . .Wn such that 〈M, (
⋃n
i=1Wi)〉 ∈ D and
M |=s χ′(W1 . . .Wn).
Proof.
1 ⇒ 2 If such a S exists, let W1 = W2 = . . .Wn = S. Then since
⋃
iWi = S
we have that 〈M, (
⋃
iWi)〉 ∈ D, and since χ
′(S . . . S) is the same as χ(S)
we have that M |= χ′(W1 . . .Wn).
25As per Definition 2.12, in FO(D), the atoms Dt for D ∈ D cannot occur negated. Indeed,
FO(D) contains only expressions in Negation Normal Form with first order literals, first order
connectives and atoms Dt.
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X =
v1 w1 v2 v3 w2 w3 v4 w4
s0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1
s1 1 1 1 2 1 2 0 1
s2 2 2 0 0 1 1 0 1
X ↾ (v1 = w1)(v1) = {s0, s1, s2}(v1) = {0, 1, 2}.
X ↾ (v2v3 = w2w3)(v2v3) = {s0, s1}(v2v3) = {〈0, 1〉, 〈1, 2〉}.
X ↾ (v4 = w4)(v4) = ∅(v4) = ∅.
Figure 2: A possible representation of the set of elements A = {0, 1, 2}, of the
set of tuples B = {〈0, 1〉, 〈1, 2〉}, and of the empty set C = ∅ in a single team.
The variables v1 and w1 encode A, the variables v2v3 and w2w3 encode B, and
the variables v4 and w4 encode C. In this way, it is possible to represent empty
and nonempty relations within a single team.
2 ⇒ 1 Suppose that suchW1 . . .Wn exist, and let S =
⋃
iWi. Then by assump-
tion 〈M,S〉 ∈ D; and furthermore, since the Wi occur only positively in
χ′ and Wi ⊆ S for all i we have that M |= χ′(S . . . S), that is, M |= χ(S).
In this way, we managed to “bring out” all the dependencies of D and con-
vert the remaining expression to First Order Logic. Now we need to show that
it is possible to “put them back in”.
To do so, we will have to encode multiple relations into a single team.
The obvious way to do so would be to fix tuples of variables v1 . . .vn and
let a team X correspond to the sets of tuples X(vi) = {s(vi) : s ∈ X}
for i = 1 . . . n; but a problem with this is that, as long as the team X is
nonempty, it would not be possible to encode empty sets of tuples. So we
will instead use two tuples of variables26 vi and wi to encode the relation
Ri = X ↾ (vi = wi)(vi) = {s(vi) : s ∈ X, s(vi) = s(wi)}: see Figure 2 for an
illustration.
Using this representation, it is first of all possible to state that the union
of the sets of tuples of elements encoded by certain variables satisfy a certain
dependency:
Lemma 3.5. Let D be any dependency, let k be its arity, let v1 . . .vn, w1 . . .wn
be tuples of variables such that all vi and wi have length equal to the arity of
26This is more than what is strictly necessary – a tuple of variables and one extra variable
to act as a flag would be enough – but it makes the formulas somewhat simpler, and in this
work the number of existential quantifiers is not a concern.
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D, and let D∪(v1 . . .vn;w1 . . .wn) be the FO(D) formula
∀p1 . . . pn∀q∃z0z1
((∨
i
q = pi
)
→֒

∧
i≤n



∧
j<i
q 6= pj ∧ q = pi

 →֒ z0z1 = viwi

 ∧ (z0 = z1 →֒ Dz0)




where p1 . . . pn and q are new, distinct variables and z0 and z1 are tuples of new
variables of the same length as the arity of D.
Then for all suitable models M (with at least two elements) and teams X,
M |=X D∪(v1 . . .vn;w1 . . .wn) if and only if 〈M, (
⋃n
i=1Wi)〉 ∈ D, where
Wi = X ↾ (vi = wi)(vi) = {s(vi) : s ∈ X, s(vi) = s(wi)}.
Proof. Suppose that M |=X D∪(v1 . . .vn;w1 . . .wn). Then there exist some H
and some
Y = X [M/p1 . . . pnq][H/z0z1] ↾
(∨
i
q = pi
)
such that
1. For all i = 1 . . . n and for all s ∈ X [M/p1 . . . pnq], if i is the smallest index
such that s(q) = s(pi) then H(s) = {s(viwi)};
2. For Z = Y ↾ (z0 = z1), 〈M,Z(z0)〉 ∈ D.
Now, Y is precisely the set of all tuples inX [M/p1 . . . pnq][H/z0z1] such that the
value of q is equal to the value of some pi. Therefore, the first condition implies
that Y ↾ (z0 = z1)(z0) =
⋃
i(Y ↾ (vi = wi)(vi)) =
⋃
i(X ↾ (vi = wi)(vi));
and then the second condition implies that 〈M, (
⋃
iX ↾ (vi = wi)(vi))〉 ∈ D, as
required.
Conversely, suppose that 〈M, (
⋃
iX ↾ (vi = wi)(vi))〉 ∈ D. Then let 0 and
1 be two distinct elements inM , let 0 and 1 represent tuples of k zeroes or ones,
and let H : X [M/p1 . . . pnq]→ P(M2k)\{∅} be defined as
H(s) =
{
{s(viwi)} if i is the smallest index such that s(q) = s(pi);
{01} if s(q) 6= s(pi) ∀i ∈ {1 . . . n}.
Then let Y = X [M/p1 . . . pnq][H/z0z1] ↾ (
∨
i q = pi). By construction, it is
clear that
M |=Y

∧
j<i
q 6= pj ∧ q = pi

 →֒ z0z1 = viwi
for all i = 1 . . . n. Moreover, Y (z0z1) =
⋃
iX(viwi), because for each s ∈ X and
for each i = 1 . . . n there exists an assignment si = s[0 . . . 1 . . . 1/p1 . . . pn][1/q] ∈
X [M/p1 . . . pnq] such that s
i(pj) is 0 if j < i and 1 otherwise and such that
si(q) = 1, and for such an assignment we have that H(si) = {si(viwi)} =
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{s(viwi)}, as required. Thus we also have that Y ↾ (z0 = z1)(z0) =
⋃
iX ↾
(vi = wi)(vi). But by assumption we know that
〈M,
⋃
iX ↾ (vi = wi)(vi)〉 ∈ D; therefore 〈M,Y ↾ (z0 = z1)(z0)〉 ∈ D, and thus
M |=Y z0 = z1 →֒ Dz0, and finally M |=X D∪(v1 . . .vn;w1 . . .wn) as required.
Finally, we need a way to “put back” the dependencies of D into the formula.
The next two lemmas take care of that:
Lemma 3.6. Let ψ(W ) be a quantifier-free FO(D) formula in which the k-ary
relation symbol W occurs at most once and only positively and let ψ′(v,w) be
the formula obtained by replacing the (unique) occurrence W t of W in ψ with
v = w ∧ t = w, where v and w are tuples of new variables of length equal to
the arity of W . Then, for all suitable models M, relations W and teams X,
M |=X ψ(W ) if and only if there exists some H such that
1. M |=X[H/vw] ψ
′(v,w);
2. X [H/vw] ↾ (v = w)(v) ⊆W .
Proof. The proof is by structural induction on ψ.
• If ψ is of the form W t, ψ′ is simply v = w ∧ t = w. Now if M |=X W t it
must be that s(t) ∈W for all s ∈ X . Thus, if we define H so that H(s) =
{s(t)s(t)} for all s ∈ X we have at once that X [H/vw] ↾ (v = w)(v) =
{s(t) : s ∈ X} ⊆ W , and furthermore M |=X[H/vw] v = w ∧ t = w as
required.
Conversely, suppose that there exists some H such that X [H/vw] ↾ (v =
w)(v) ⊆ W and M |=X[H/vw] v = w ∧ t = w. Now, for any s ∈ X , let
m = s(t): then s[mm/vw] ∈ X [H/vw] ↾ (v = w), and thereforem ∈W .
Thus M |=X W t as required.
• If ψ(W ) is of the form ψ1∨ψ2, let us assume – without loss of generality –
that W occurs only in ψ1. Then ψ
′(v,w) is ψ′1(v,w) ∨ ψ2. Now suppose
that M |=X ψ1(W ) ∨ ψ2. Then X = Y ∪ Z for two Y , Z such that
M |=Y ψ1(W ) and M |=Z ψ2. So by induction hypothesis we know that
there exists some H : Y → P(M2k)\{∅} such that M |=Y [H/vw] ψ
′
1(v,w)
and Y [H/vw] ↾ (v = w)(v) ⊆ W . Now let m1 and m2 be two arbitrary,
distinct tuples of elements, and let H ′ : X → P(M2k)\{∅} be defined as
H ′(s) =


H(s) ∪ {m1m2} if s ∈ Y ∩ Z;
H(s) if s ∈ Y \Z;
{m1m2} if s ∈ Z\Y.
Then X [H ′/vw] = Y [H/vw] ∪ Z[m1m2/vw], M |=Z[m1m2/vw] ψ2 by
locality, and X [H ′/vw] ↾ (v = w)(v) = Y [H/vw] ↾ (v = w)(v) ⊆ W .
Moreover M |=X[H′/vw] ψ
′
1(v,w) ∨ ψ2, as required.
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Conversely, suppose that there is some H such that
M |=X[H/vw] ψ
′
1(v,w) ∨ ψ2 and such that X [H/vw] ↾ (v = w)(v) ⊆ W .
Then X [H/vw] = Y ′ ∪ Z ′ for two Y ′, Z ′ such that M |=Y ′ ψ′1(v,w) and
M |=Z′ ψ2. Now let Y = {s ∈ X : ∃m1m2 s.t. s[m1m2/vw] ∈ Y ′} and
let H ′ : Y → P(M2k)\{∅} be defined as
H ′(s) = {m1m2 ∈M
2k : s[m1m2/vw] ∈ Y
′}.
Then by constructionH ′(s) 6= ∅ for all s ∈ Y , and furthermore Y [H ′/vw] =
Y ′; therefore, M |=Y [H′/vw] ψ
′
1(v,w), and since Y
′ ⊆ X [H/vw] we have
that
Y [H ′/vw] ↾ (v = w)(v) = Y ′ ↾ (v = w)(v)
⊆ X [H/vw] ↾ (v = w)(v) ⊆W.
Then by induction hypothesis we have that M |=Y ψ1(W ). Now let Z =
{s ∈ X : ∃m1m2 s.t. s[m1m2/vw] ∈ Z ′}. By locality, we have that
M |=Z ψ2, and moreover X = Y ∪ Z (since if s ∈ X then there are
some m1m2 such that s[m1m2/vw] ∈ X [H/vw] = Y ′ ∪ Z ′) and hence
M |=X ψ1(W ) ∨ ψ2 as required.
• If ψ(W ) is of the form ψ1 ∧ ψ2, let us again assume that W occurs only
in ψ1. Then ψ
′(v,w) = ψ′1(v,w) ∧ ψ2. Suppose that M |=X ψ1(W ) ∧ ψ2:
then M |=X ψ1(W ) and M |=X ψ2, and by induction hypothesis there
exists some H such that X [H/vw] ↾ (v = w)(v) ⊆ W and M |=X[H/vw]
ψ′1(v,w). Furthermore, by locality, we have that M |=X[H/vw] ψ2, and
therefore M |=X[H/vw] ψ
′
1(v,w) ∧ ψ2 as required.
Conversely, suppose that there is some H such thatM |=X[H/vw] ψ
′
1(v,w)
∧ψ2 and X [H/vw] ↾ (v = w)(v) ⊆ W . Then by locality M |=X ψ2 and
by induction hypothesis M |=X ψ1(W ), and hence M |=X ψ1(W ) ∧ ψ2 as
required.
Lemma 3.7. Let χ(W1 . . .Wq) = ∀x1∃y1 . . . ∀xn∃ynψ(W1 . . .Wq) be a FO(D)
sentence in Quantifier Normal Form in which the Wi – which all have the same
arity k – occur only positively and at most once each, and let D be a downwards
closed dependency of the same arity of theWi. Then the following are equivalent:
1. There exist W1 . . .Wq such that 〈M,
⋃
iWi〉 ∈ D and M |= χ(W1 . . .Wq);
2. M |= ∀x1 . . . ∃yn∃v1w1 . . .vqwq(D∪(v1 . . .vq;w1 . . .wq)∧
ψ′(v1w1 . . .vqwq)), where ψ
′(v1w1 . . .vqwq) is obtained – as in the pre-
vious lemma – by replacing each Witi with vi = wi ∧ ti = wi for tuples
of new variables vi and wi.
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Proof. Suppose that 1. holds. Then there exist W1 . . .Wq such that
〈M,
⋃
iWi〉 ∈ D and M |= χ(W1 . . .Wq). Then in particular there exist func-
tionsH1 . . . Hn such that, forX = {ǫ}[M/x1][H1/y1] . . . [M/xn][Hn/yn],M |=X
ψ(W1 . . .Wq). Applying repeatedly Lemma 3.6, we can findK1 . . .Kq such that,
for Y = X [K1/v1w1] . . . [Kq/vqwq],
a) M |=Y ψ
′(v1w1 . . .vqwq);
b) For all i ∈ 1 . . . q, Y ↾ (vi = wi)(vi) ⊆Wi.
Now, for all i, let W ′i = Y ↾ (vi = wi)(vi). Then since D is downwards
closed and
⋃
iW
′
i ⊆
⋃
iWi we have that M |=Y D(
⋃
iW
′
i ), and hence M |=Y
D∪(v1 . . .vq;w1 . . .wq) by Lemma 3.5. This proves that
M |=X ∃v1w1 . . .vqwq(D∪(v1 . . .vq;w1 . . .wq) ∧ ψ
′(v1w1 . . .vqwq))
and hence that 2. holds.
Conversely, suppose that 2. holds. Then there exist functions H1 . . . Hn,
K1 . . .Kq such that, for X = {ǫ}[M/x1][H1/y1] . . . [M/xn][Hn/yn] and for Y =
X [K1/v1w1] . . . [Kq/vqwq],M |=Y D∪(v1 . . .vq;w1 . . .wq)∧ψ′(v1w1 . . .vqwq).
Now, for each i = 1 . . . q, let Wi = Y ↾ (vi = wi)(vi). Then by Lemma
3.5 we have that 〈M,
⋃
iWi〉 ∈ D; and furthermore, by Lemma 3.6 M |=Y
ψ(W1 . . .Wn). But then by locality M |=X ψ(W1 . . .Wn), and hence M |=
χ(W1 . . .Wn) and 1. holds.
We can now finally prove the main result of this section:
Theorem 3.8. Let D be any family of downwards closed dependencies and let
S be any strongly first order family of dependencies. Then S is safe for D.
Proof. Let φ be a sentence of FO(S,D). Then, by Lemmas 3.3 and 3.4, there
exist a first order formula θ(W 11 . . .W
r(1)
1 , . . . ,W
1
k . . .W
r(k)
k ), in which each W
j
i
occurs only once, and dependencies Dj(1) . . .Dj(k) ∈ D such that the following
are equivalent for all models M:
A) M |= φ;
B) There exist relations W 11 . . .W
r(1)
1 , . . . ,W
1
k . . .W
r(k)
k such that
• For all i = 1 . . . k,
〈
M,
⋃r(i)
t=1W
t
i
〉
∈ Dj(i);
• M |= θ(W 11 . . .W
r(1)
1 , . . . ,W
1
k . . .W
r(k)
k ).
Now let θ(W 11 . . .W
r(1)
1 , . . . ,W
1
k . . .W
r(k)
k ) have Quantifier Normal Form
∀x1∃y1 . . .∀xl∃ylψ(W
1
1 . . .W
r(1)
1 , . . . ,W
1
k . . .W
r(n)
k )
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But applying repeatedly Lemma 3.7 and the fact that all Dj(i) are downwards
closed27 we can see that there exists some FO(D) sentence
φ∗ :=∀x1∃y1 . . . ∀xl∃yl ∃v
1
1w
1
1 . . .v
r(1)
1 w
r(1)
1 . . .v
1
kw
1
k . . .v
r(k)
k w
r(k)
k
((
∧
i
(Dj(i))∪(v
1
i . . .v
r(i)
i ,w
1
i . . .w
r(i)
i ))∧
ψ′(v11w
1
1 . . .v
r(1)
1 w
r(1)
1 . . .v
1
kw
1
k . . .v
r(k)
k w
r(k)
k ))
which is true if and only if B) above holds. Thus, every FO(S,D) sentence is
equivalent to some FO(D) sentence - in other words, S is safe for D.
4 Characterizing strongly first order, relativiz-
able, downwards
closed dependencies
We can now prove that all dependencies that are nontrivial, relativizable, down-
wards closed and strongly first order are definable in terms of constancy. To do
so, we will need to use the Chang-Makkai Theorem, applying it not to unary
relations (as is presented e.g. in Theorem 5.3.6 of [5]) but to k-ary relations (as
mentioned in [4], the proof carries over to this case without problems. For ref-
erence, the Appendix contains the detailed proof of the case that interests us).
On the other hand, it suffices to consider countable structures and vocabularies
containing only a relation symbol R.
So this is the variant of the Chang-Makkai Theorem that we need:
Theorem 4.1. Let Φ(R) be a first order sentence on the vocabulary {R}, where
R is k-ary. The following are equivalent:
1. For every countable model M over the signature {R}, |{R : R ⊆Mk,M |=
Φ(R)}| < ℵ1;
2. There are a finite number of formulas θ1(x, z) . . . θn(x, z), over the empty
vocabulary, such that
φ(R) |=
n∨
i=1
∃z∀x(Rx↔ θi(x, z)).
The idea of this section’s main proof is to show that if D is strongly first
order then the property Dmax of being maximal among the R that satisfy D is
also strongly first order; that whenever 〈M,R〉 ∈ D there is at least one R′ ⊇ R
such that 〈M,R′〉 ∈ Dmax; and that for every countable model there must
27For the applications of Lemma 3.7 after the first one we can treat the (Dj(i))∪ already
introduced as ordinary dependency atoms, so that the expression is still in Quantifier Normal
Form.
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be a countable number of such maximal R′. Then we use the above version
of the Chang-Makkai Theorem to show that these maximal sets are definable
over the empty signature, and use the downwards closure property to define
the D atoms via Boolean disjunctions (that is, unraveling Definition 2.23, via
constancy atoms).
Proposition 4.2. Let D be a downwards closed, strongly first order dependency.
Then there exists a first order dependency Dmax such that 〈M,R〉 ∈ Dmax if and
only if 〈M,R〉 ∈ D and there is no S ) R such that 〈M,S〉 ∈ D. Furthermore,
Dmax is strongly first order itself.
Proof. Since D is strongly first order, the FO(D) sentence
φ(R) := ∃x(¬Rx ∧ ∀y((¬Ry ∧ x 6= y) ∨Dy))
is equivalent to some first order sentence. Observe that M |= φ(R) if and only
if there exists some S such that R ( S and 〈M,S〉 ∈ D. Indeed, suppose that
such a S exists and let a ∈ S\R. Then, choosing a as the only value for x,28
we have that M |={(x:a)} ¬Rx. Now let X = {(x : a)}[M/y], and split it into
Z = {s ∈ X : s(y) ∈ S} and Y = X\Z = {s ∈ X : s(y) 6∈ S}. Clearly
M |=Z Dy, because Z(y) = S. Moreover, for all s ∈ Y we have that s(y) 6∈ R,
because s(y) 6∈ S and R ⊆ S, and that s(y) 6= s(x), because s(x) = a ∈ S.
Thus we have that M |=Y ¬Ry ∧ x 6= y, as required.
Conversely, suppose that M |={ǫ} φ(R), where ǫ is the empty assignment.
Then there exists some X = {ǫ}[K/x][M/y] such that X(x) ∩ R = ∅ and
M |=X (¬Ry ∧ x 6= y) ∨ Dy. Thus, X = Y ∪ Z for two Y , Z such that
M |=Y (¬Ry ∧ x 6= y) and M |=Z Dy. Let S = Z(y): then 〈M,S〉 ∈ D.
Furthermore, R is contained in S: indeed, for all m ∈ R there is some s ∈ X
is such that s(y) = m, and then s ∈ Z, because M |=Y ¬Ry and X = Y ∪ Z.
Finally, S is not contained in R: indeed, if a is a possible value for x in X then
a 6∈ R and a ∈ S (because the assignment (xy : aa) is in X but not in Y ).
If φ(R) is equivalent to a first order sentence, the same is true of its nega-
tion. Let ψ(R) be the first order sentence equivalent to the negation of φ(R):
then M |= ψ(R) if and only if there is no S ) R such that 〈M,S〉 ∈ D. Thus
Dmax(R) is equivalent to D(R)∧ψ(R), and therefore it is first order. It remains
to show that it is strongly first order as a dependency.
Now ψ(R) is upwards closed in R: indeed, if there is no S ) R such that
D(S) and R ⊆ R′ then clearly there is no S ) R′ such that D(S) either. By
Theorem 2.27, upwards closed dependencies are strongly first order; therefore,
the dependency E(R) = {〈M,R〉 : 〈M,R〉 |= ψ(R)} is strongly first order.
But by Theorem 3.8, strongly first order dependencies are safe for downwards
closed dependencies. So in particular E is safe for D, and the atom Dmax(t)
is definable in FO(D,E) as Dmax(t) := Dt ∧ Et. Therefore every sentence
φ ∈ FO(Dmax) is equivalent to some sentence φ′ ∈ FO(D,E), which by the safety
28More precisely: picking x according to the function H : {ǫ} → P(M)\{∅} such that
H(ǫ) = a.
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of E for D is equivalent to some sentence φ′′ ∈ FO(D), which by the strongly
first orderness of D is equivalent to some first order sentence. Therefore Dmax
is strongly first order, as required.
The following consequence of the above proposition will also be necessary
for our proof:
Corollary 4.3. Let D(R) be a downwards closed, strongly first order depen-
dency and let M,R be such that 〈M,R〉 ∈ D. Then there exists a S ⊇ R such
that 〈M,S〉 ∈ Dmax.
Proof. Consider the FO(Dmax) sentence
θ(T ) := ∀x(¬Tx ∨Dmaxx)
It is easy to check that M |= θ(T ) if and only if there exists some K ⊇ T such
that 〈M,K〉 ∈ Dmax; and since, as we just saw, Dmax is strongly first order,
θ(T ) is equivalent to some first order sentence. Let χ(T ) be the first order
sentence equivalent to the negation of θ(T ): then M |= χ(T ) if and only if there
is no K ⊇ T such that 〈M,K〉 ∈ Dmax. Furthermore, χ(T ) is clearly upwards
closed in T , since if there are no K ⊇ T with 〈M,K〉 ∈ Dmax and T ⊆ T ′ then
there are no K ⊇ T ′ with 〈M,K〉 ∈ Dmax either.
Therefore by Theorem 2.27 the dependency F = {〈M,T 〉 : 〈M,T 〉 |= χ(T )}
is strongly first order. Consider now then the FO(D,F) sentence on the empty
signature
∃x(Dx ∧ Fx).
By construction, this is true if and only if there exists a relation R which satisfies
D(R) but is contained in no maximal superset; and since strongly first order
dependencies are safe for downwards closed dependencies by Theorem 3.8, this is
equivalent to some FO(D) sentence and thus – sinceD is strongly first order itself
– to some first order sentence. Therefore, there exists a first order sentence η
over the empty vocabulary such that M |= η if and only if there is some relation
R with domain M which satisfies D(R) but which is not contained in any R′
satisfying Dmax(R).
This is clearly not true if the model M is finite, so for all finite models M we
have that M |= ¬η. But then, since ¬η is a first order sentence over the empty
signature, by compactness the same is true for all models, finite or infinite.
By the semantics of η this implies that whenever 〈M,R〉 ∈ D there exists
some R′ ⊇ R such that 〈M,R′〉 ∈ Dmax, as required.
As a quick aside, it is perhaps worth briefly pointing out here that this
corollary fails for arbitrary first order dependencies: if 〈M,R〉 ∈ D, it is not
necessarily the case that there exists some maximal R′ ⊇ R such that 〈M,R′〉 ∈
D. As a counterexample, let D(R) be the 4-ary dependency which is defined
by the conjunction of the following axioms:
• If we write “x ≤ y” for ∃zuRxyzu, the relation ≤ is a linear order with
endpoints;
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• If we write “Bz” for ∃xyuRxyzu, B is not true of the starting point of the
linear order, it is true of some element, and whenever it is true of some
element it is true of its immediate predecessor along ≤ (if any exists);
• If we write “Tu” for ∃xyzRxyzu, there exists some element a such that
¬Ba and such that for all b, Tb if and only if b ≤ a in the above order.
Then consider a model M with domain N ∪ {∞} and the team X with domain
{x, y, z, w} defined as
{s : s(x) ≤ s(y), s(z) =∞ and s(u) ≤ 1}
corresponding to the graphical representation
0 1 2 3
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
∞
B
≤ ≤ ≤ ≤
T
Then it is easy to check that 〈M,X(t)〉 ∈ D, but no maximal R′ ⊇ X(t)
satisfying D exists: the range of T (that is, the projection of the relation over
the fourth element) can be extended to any set of the form {n ∈ N : n ≤ m}
for any m ∈ N but not to N or to N ∪ {∞}, while nothing can be added to the
linear order ≤ (that is, to the projection over the first two elements) or to B
(that is, to the projection over the third element) without violating our axioms.
The fact that whenever M |=X Dt there exists some maximal X ′ ⊇ X such
that M |=X′ Dt, therefore, is one that does not hold for all first order depen-
dencies (although it is easy to check that it holds for functional dependence,
independence and inclusion, and although we just proved that it holds for all
downwards closed strongly first order dependencies).
Proposition 4.4. Let A = {a1, a2, . . .} be a countable set of elements and let
D be a strongly first order, downwards closed, relativizable dependency of arity
k. Then there exist only countably many R ⊆ Ak such that 〈A,R〉 ∈ Dmax.
Proof. Suppose that there exist uncountably many such R. Then let I be a
(k + 1)-ary relation symbol, let P be a unary symbol, and consider the first
order theory T containing the following axioms:
(a) ∃x1 . . . xn
(∧
i<j≤n xi 6= xj ∧
∧n
i=1 Pxi
)
, for all n ∈ N;
(b) ∀z∀q(Izq →
∧
zi∈z
Pzi);
(c) ∀qDPmax(I q), where D
P
max(I q) is obtained from D
P
max(R) (that is, from
the relativization of Dmax(R) to P ) by replacing every Rv with Ivq;
(d) ¬χ(I, P ), where χ(I, P ) is the first order sentence equivalent29 to the FO(DP )
sentence ∀q∃z(¬Izq ∧DP z).
29Such a first order sentence exists because D is strongly first order and relativizable. Note
that we do not need Dmax to be relativizable – for (c) we only need that DPmax(R) is a first
order sentence, which is certainly true since Dmax(R) is a first order sentence – but just that
D is relativizable.
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I state that if our assumption is true, the above theory – that is first order and
has a finite vocabulary – has only uncountable models. This is clearly impossible
by the Lo¨wenheim-Skolem Theorem, and therefore our assumption cannot hold.
Indeed, suppose that M = 〈M,P, I〉 is a countable model of T . Then by (a)
P is infinite and countable, and we can assume that it is A up to isomorphism;
by (b) and (c), for every m ∈ M the relation I m = {a ∈ Mk : 〈a,m〉 ∈ I} is
in P k and satisfies DPmax in M , that is to say satisfies Dmax in P ; and by (d),
as we will see, every relation that satisfies Dmax in P is equal to I m for some
m ∈ M . But we said that A – and, therefore, P – contains uncountably many
distinct R which satisfy Dmax(R) in it, and therefore this is impossible.
On the other hand – again, postponing the verification that (d) holds if and
only if I enumerates all R that satisfy Dmax(R) in P – there certainly exists
an uncountable model M = 〈M,P, I〉 of the above theory: let M be a set of
cardinality 2ℵ0 containing A, let the interpretation of P be A itself, and let
I m range over all (uncountably many, but certainly no more than |M | = 2|A|)
R ⊆ P k such that 〈P,R〉 ∈ Dmax as m ranges over M . Thus our theory has an
uncountable model but no countable models, which is impossible.
We now verify that (d) holds if and only if I m enumerates all relations
that satisfy Dmax with respect to P , that is, that the FO(D
P ) sentence ξ :=
∀q∃z(¬Izq∧DP z) is true if and only if I m does not enumerate all such subsets
as m ranges over M .
• Left to right: Suppose that M |= ξ. Then there exists a team X =
{ǫ}[M/q][H/z], for some function H , such that M |=X ¬Izq ∧DP z. Now
let R = X(z). From the second conjunct, we have at once that R ⊆ P k
and that 〈P,R〉 ∈ D; and for every q ∈ M there exists some assignment
s ∈ X for which s(q) = m, and thus from the first conjunct we have
that 〈s(z),m〉 6∈ I, that is s(z) 6∈ I m. Thus, 〈P,R〉 ∈ D but R is not
contained in any I m; and since by Corollary 4.3 this R must be contained
in some relation that satisfies Dmax in P , it follows that I m does not
enumerate all maximal relations.
• Right to left: Suppose that I m does not enumerate all subsets of P k
which satisfy Dmax in P for m ranging in M . Then in particular there
exists some R ⊆ P k such that 〈P,R〉 ∈ Dmax and R\I m 6= ∅ for all m ∈
M . Now consider the following function H : {ǫ}[M/q]→ P(Mk)\{∅}:
H(s) = R\I (s(q)) = {a ∈ R : 〈a, s(q)〉 6∈ I}.
As we just saw, H(s) 6= ∅ for all s ∈ {ǫ}[M/q]. For X = {ǫ}[M/q][H/z],
we clearly have that M |=X ¬Izq. Furthermore, M |=X DP z: indeed,
X(z) ⊆ R by construction, 〈P,R〉 ∈ D since 〈P,R〉 ∈ Dmax, thus
〈P,X(z)〉 ∈ D by downwards closure and finally M |=X DP z. There-
fore M |= ξ as required.
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At this point, our conclusion follows from the Chang-Makkai Theorem.
Theorem 4.5. Let D(R) be a downwards closed, strongly first order, relativiz-
able dependency that has the empty team property (that is, it is satisfied by the
empty team)30. Then it is definable in FO(=(·)).
Proof. By Proposition 4.4, |{R : R ⊆ Mk, 〈M,R〉 ∈ Dmax}| is countable for
all countable models M. Thus, by Theorem 4.1 and Proposition 4.2 , there
exist a finite number of first order formulas θ1(x, z) . . . θn(x, z) over the empty
vocabulary (and in which we can assume – via variable renaming – that the
variables of xz are not being quantified over), such that
Dmax(R) |=
n∨
i=1
∃z∀x(Rx↔ θi(x, z)).
For each i, let χi(z) := D(θi( , z)) be the first order formula obtained from
D(R) by replacing every occurrence Rt of R with θi(t, z), so that M |=(z:m)
χi(z) if and only if 〈M,R〉 ∈ D for R = {a : M |= θi(a,m))}.
Then I state that Dv is equivalent to the FO(=(·),⊔) formula
n⊔
i=1
∃z(=(z) ∧ χi(z) ∧ θi(v, z)) (1)
Where ⊔ represents the Boolean disjunction of Definition 2.23, which is defin-
able in terms of constancy atoms.
Indeed, suppose that M |=X Dv. Then for R = X(v) we have that
〈M,R〉 ∈ D, and thus by Corollary 4.3 there exists some R′ ⊇ R such that
〈M,R′〉 ∈ Dmax. Thus, there exists some i = 1 . . . n and a fixed tuple m of
elements of M such that M |=(z:m) ∀x(R
′x ↔ θi(x, z)). Since 〈M,R′〉 ∈ D,
M |=(z:m) χi(z). Since R ⊆ R
′, M |=(z:m) ∀x(Rx → θi(x, z)) and therefore by
Proposition 2.7 M |=X[m/z] χi(z) ∧ θi(v, z). Moreover, clearly M |=X[m/z]=(z),
and so M |=X[m/z]=(z) ∧ χi(z) ∧ θi(v, z), and finally Equation (1) holds in X .
Conversely, suppose that (1) is true in X . Then there exists some i and some
tuple m of elements such that M |=X[m/z] χi(z) and M |=X[m/z] θi(v, z). From
the first statement, we obtain at once that the set R′ = {a : M |= θi(a,m)}
is such that 〈M,R′〉 ∈ D. From the second one, we obtain that R = X(v) is
contained in R′. By the downwards closure of D we can then conclude that
〈M,R〉 ∈ D, that is M |=X Dv.
5 Conclusions and Further Work
In this paper, a characterization of downwards closed, relativizable, strongly first
order dependencies was found by showing that – aside from the trivially false one
30The only downwards closed dependency that does not have this property is the trivial one
that is false for all teams.
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– these are precisely the ones that are definable in terms of constancy atoms.
This is a special case of Conjecture 1, according to which all strongly first
order dependencies are definable in terms of constancy atoms and upwards closed
dependencies ; and it is the hope of the author that the techniques developed in
this work may be adapted to generalize this result, ideally all the way to a full
proof of Conjecture 1.
A reasonable enough starting point could be to attempt to get rid, or alter-
natively prove the necessity, of the requirement of relativizability, for instance
by showing that all strongly first order dependencies (or at least all downwards
closed ones) are relativizable anyway.
Another possible direction in which the present work can be expanded could
be to consider not only logics FO(D) obtained by adding dependency atoms to
First Order Logic, but more in general logics L(D) where L can be based on
arbitrary choices of connectives and operators (interpreted in Team Semantics).
Much like studying the more general notion of safety gave us in this work the
tools necessary to prove the above mentioned result about strongly first order
dependencies, it is possible that studying the notions of safety and strong first
orderness in the more general L(D) case may give us the tools for solving the
FO(D) one; and, moreover, such an investigation would connect the research pro-
gram to which this work belongs to the related area of the study of generalized
quantifiers in Team Semantics [10, 35, 11, 2].
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A The Chang-Makkai Theorem for Non-Unary
Relations and Countable Models
Here I report for convenience a proof of Theorem 4.1. It is no different from
the usual proof (via recursive saturation) of the Chang-Makkai Theorem for
countable models; but I recall it here anyway to verify that it works even for
k-ary relations, since this theorem is typically presented only for unary relations.
We need to prove the equivalence of the following two statements:
1. For every countable model M over the signature {R}, |{R : R ⊆Mk,M |=
φ(R)}| < ℵ1;
2. There are a finite number of formulas θ1(x, z) . . . θn(x, z), over the empty
vocabulary, such that
φ(R) |=
∨
i
∃z∀x(Rx↔ θi(x, z)). (2)
34
The direction from 2. to 1. is obvious. For the direction from 1. to 2., we
reason as follows. Suppose that 2. fails. Then the theory
{φ(R)} ∪ {∀z¬∀x(Rx↔ θ(x, z)) : θ(x, z) ∈ FO}, (3)
where z ranges over all tuples of all lengths and θ(x, z) ranges over all first
order formulas over the empty signature, is satisfiable. Let M = 〈M,R〉 be a
countable, recursively saturated model for it. Let k be the arity of R, and let
(t(i) : i ∈ N) be an enumeration of all k-tuples of elements in M . We will show
that there exist 2ℵ0 distinct R′ ⊆Mk such that 〈M,R′〉 is isomorphic to 〈M,R〉;
and since M |= φ(R), this in particular will show that 1. fails.
The idea of the proof is to define two functions G and H , sending – for
every n ∈ N – every function f : {0 . . . n− 1} → {0, 1} into some G(f), H(f) ∈
{0 . . . n− 1} →Mk such that
(i) If f ⊆ g then G(f) ⊆ G(g) and H(f) ⊆ H(g);
(ii) For all f : {0 . . . n− 1} → {0, 1},
〈M,G(f)〉 ≡ 〈M,H(f)〉,
where we write G(f) as a shorthand for the tuple of elements (G(f)(i)j :
i ∈ 0 . . . n− 1, j ∈ 1 . . . k) and similarly for H(f);
(iii) If Dom(f) = {0 . . . n− 1} for n of the form 3m for some m ∈ N then
G(f ∪ {〈n, 0〉}) = G(f ∪ {〈n, 1〉}) = G(f) ∪ {〈n, t(m)〉};
(iv) If Dom(f) = {0 . . . n− 1} for n of the form 3m+ 1 then
H(f ∪ {〈n, 0〉}) = H(f ∪ {〈n, 1〉}) = H(f) ∪ {〈n, t(m)〉};
(v) If Dom(f) = {0, . . . n−1} for n of the form 3m+2 then there are two tuples
b0 ∈ R, b1 6∈ R such that
G(f ∪ {〈n, 0〉}) = G(f) ∪ {〈n,b0〉};
G(f ∪ {〈n, 1〉}) = G(f) ∪ {〈n,b1〉};
H(f ∪ {〈n, 0〉}) = H(f ∪ {〈n, 1〉}).
Before proving that these G, H exist, let us verify that their existence would
lead to the required conclusion of there being uncountably many R′ isomorphic
to R. Because of (i), we can apply G and H also to functions f : N→ {0, 1} in
the obvious way by setting
G(f) =
⋃
n∈N
{G(f|0...n) : n ∈ N}, H(f) =
⋃
n∈N
{H(f|0...n) : n ∈ N}
and still have that 〈M,G(f)〉 ≡ 〈M,H(f)〉 (every first order formula will involve
a finite number of constant symbols, so this follows trivially from (ii)).
For any such f : N→ {0, 1}, sinceM (without the relation R) is a countable
model over the empty signature31 and since by (iii) and (iv) every element of
M appears eventually in both G(f) and H(f),32 it follows that the function
ιf sending, for each i ∈ N and each j ∈ 1 . . . k, G(f)(i)j into H(f)(i)j is an
automorphism of M .
If the smallest index n such that f(n) 6= g(n) is of the form 3m+2 then the
automorphisms ιf and ιg differ and map R into two different relations: indeed,
ιf maps some b0 ∈ R into some tuple c = H(f)(n), so c ∈ ιf [R], while ιg maps
some b1 6∈ R into the same c, so c 6∈ ιg[R]. But there are 2ℵ0 many functions
every pair of which differs in the first place in an index of this form,33 and
therefore there exist 2ℵ0 pairwise distinct automorphic images of R. Thus there
are uncountably many R such that M |= φ(R), as required.
It remains to show that the F , G described above can be constructed. We
proceed by induction on n ∈ N, and there are three cases to consider:
• n is of the form 3m:
In this case, we extend G by setting – for all f – G(f ∪ {〈n, 0〉}) = G(f ∪
{〈n, 1〉}) = G(f) ∪ {〈n, t(m)〉}, and we must show that there exists some
tuple t′ ∈Mk such that
〈M,G(f), t(m)〉 ≡ 〈M,H(f), t′〉
where we know, by induction hypothesis, that 〈M,G(f)〉 ≡ 〈M,H(f)〉.
This is clearly the case, because recursively saturated models are countably
homogeneous.34
Then extend H by setting H(f ∪ {〈n, 0〉}) = H(f ∪ {〈n, 1〉}) = H(f) ∪
{〈n, t′〉}: the conditions about F and G are still satisfied.
• n is of the form 3m+ 1:
In this case, we extend H as H(f ∪ {〈n, 0〉}) = H(f ∪ {〈n, 1〉}) = H(f) ∪
{〈n, t(m)〉}, and we must show that there exists some tuple t′ ∈Mk such
that
〈M,G(f), t′〉 ≡ 〈M,H(f), t(m)〉
31We could use the fact that it is recursively saturated and countable, but it is overkill for
our needs. In fact, much of this proof could probably be simplified for the case that interests
us, but we report it fully anyway.
32In fact, the same element ofM will occur multiple times, e.g. asG(f)(i)j and asG(f)(i
′)j′ .
But then, by (ii), it is also true that H(f)(i)j = H(f)(i
′)j , and vice versa.
33For any K ⊆ N and for all i ∈ N, let fK(i) be 1 if i is of the form 3m+2 for some m ∈ K
and let it be 0 otherwise. Then for all K1,K2 ⊆ N, if K1 6= K2 then fK1 and fK2 differ in
the first place in such an index.
34Or, more simply, because M is infinite and has no relation symbol in the signature aside
from R. Using the recursive saturation of 〈M,R〉 here is actually really overkill; but we need
it anyway to deal with the 3m+ 2 case.
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Again, this follows easily from countable homogeneity (or, more simply,
from the fact that M has no relation symbols in the signature).
Then extend G by setting G(f ∪ {〈n, 0〉}) = G(f ∪ {〈n, 1〉}) = G(f) ∪
{〈n, t′〉}: the conditions about F and G are still satisfied.
• n is of the form 3m+ 2:
We need to find tuples b0 ∈ R, b1 6∈ R, c such that
〈M,G(f),b0〉 ≡ 〈M,H(f), c〉
and
〈M,G(f),b1〉 ≡ 〈M,H(f), c〉.
To do this, we first find b0 ∈ R, b1 6∈ R such that 〈M,G(f),b0〉 ≡
〈M,G(f),b1〉. Suppose that no such b0,b1 exist: then for all b0 ∈ R,
consider the recursive type
{¬Rx} ∪ {θ(b0)↔ θ(x) : θ(x) ∈ FO}
where, in the above expression, θ ranges over all first order formulas (over
the empty signature) with parameters in G(f). The above expression must
be finitely unsatisfiable in 〈M,R〉; otherwise, by the recursive saturation
of (M,R), we would have that a b1 exists as required. So, for each b0 ∈ R
there exists a σb0(x) such that M |= σb0(b0) and M |= ∀x(σb0 (x) →
Rx).35 Then consider the theory
{Rx} ∪ {∀y(σ(y) → Ry)→ ¬σ(x) : σ(x) ∈ FO}
where, again, σ(x) ranges over all first order formulas over the empty
signature with parameters in G(f). This must also be finitely unsatisfiable
given the theory ofM , since otherwise by recursive saturation there would
exist some b ∈ R such that for no formula σ we haveM |= ∀y(σ(y) → Ry)
and M |= σ(b), and we just saw that σb is such a formula.
Therefore, there exists some finite number of σs, which we can write as
σ1(x, a) . . . σq(x, a) for some tuple a of parameters in G(f), such thatM |=
∀y(σi(y, a) → Ry) for all i and such that M |= ∀x(Rx →
∨
i σi(x, a)).
But then ρ(x, a) :=
∨
i σi(x, a) defines R in M in the sense that M |=
∀x(Rx↔ ρ(x, a)), which is impossible since 〈M,R〉 is a model of (3).
Thus, it is possible to find b0, b1 such that 〈M,G(f),b0〉 ≡ 〈M,G(f),b1〉.
Now let us find – using, once more, the countable homogeneity of M –
some c such that 〈M,G(f),b0〉 ≡ 〈M,H(f), c〉. Since 〈M,G(f),b0〉 ≡
35Indeed, let Γ0 = {¬Rx} ∪ {θi(b0)↔ θi(x) : i = 1 . . . l} be unsatisfiable in 〈M,R〉. Then
define σb0 (x) as
∧
{θi(x) : i = 1 . . . l,M |= θi(b0)} ∧
∧
{¬θi(x) : i = 1 . . . l,M 6|= θi(b0)}.
Clearly M |= σb0 (b0); and moreover, if M |= σb0 (c) we have that M |= θi(b0)↔ θi(c) for all
i = 1 . . . l, and therefore by the unsatisfiability of Γ0 we have that M |= Rc.
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〈M,G(f),b1〉, we then also have that 〈M,G(f),b1〉 ≡ 〈M,H(f), c〉. Fi-
nally, extend G by setting G(f ∪ {〈n, 0〉}) = G(f) ∪ {〈n,b0〉} and G(f ∪
{〈n, 1〉}) = G(f) ∪ {〈n,b1〉}, and extend H by setting H(f ∪ {〈n, 0〉}) =
H(f ∪ {〈n, 1〉}) = H(f) ∪ {〈n, c〉}. The conditions are all still satisfied,
and this concludes the proof.
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